Service regulations, input prices and export volumes : evidence from a panel of manufacturing firms by Correa López, Mónica & Doménech Vilariño, Rafael
SERVICE REGULATIONS, INPUT 
PRICES AND EXPORT VOLUMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL 
OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Mónica Correa-López and Rafael Doménech
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1707
2017
SERVICE REGULATIONS, INPUT PRICES AND EXPORT VOLUMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1707
2017
(*) We would like to thank Noelia Cámara, George Chouliarakis, Juan Ramón García and seminar participants at 
the XXXVIII Simposio de Análisis Económico, December 2013, the XV Jornadas de Economía Internacional, 
June 2014, the 41st Annual Conference of the European Association for the Research in Industrial Economics 
(EARIE), August 2014, Banco de España and BBVA for their comments and suggestions. R. Doménech thanks 
the financial support of DGICT grant ECO2014-53150-R. An earlier version of the paper circulated under the title 
«Does anti-competitive service sector regulation harm exporters? Evidence from manufacturing firms in Spain». 
Corresponding author: Mónica Correa López, A.D.G. Economics and Research, Banco de España, Calle de 




BBVA RESEARCH AND UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA
SERVICE REGULATIONS, INPUT PRICES AND EXPORT 
VOLUMES: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS (*)
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2017
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Abstract
Using a panel of firm-level data from Spanish manufacturers, this study shows that better 
service regulation reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid by downstream firms. The 
beneficial cost effects of services reforms extend to both large and small-to-medium sized 
corporations (SMEs), but the former tend to enjoy greater gains. This feature also manifests 
itself in international markets. We identify an input cost channel through which service 
regulations affect the volume of exports of large manufacturers, while the evidence of such 
channel is weaker for SMEs. Our estimates indicate that, from 1991 till 2007, large firms 
increased their volume of exports by an average of 22% as a result of the direct input cost 
effect of services reforms, such that the firms that benefited the most typically belonged to 
industries more dependent on service inputs. Furthermore, convergence to the “best practice” 
regulatory framework in services would have raised exports at least by an additional 10%. We 
conclude that firm size is relevant for the connection between services reforms, intermediate 
input prices and export volumes. 
Keywords: service regulations, intermediate input prices, exports, firm size. 
JEL classifi cation: L11, L43, F14.
Resumen
Utilizando datos de panel, este trabajo muestra que una mejor regulación en el sector 
servicios reduce el precio de los consumos intermedios que soportan las empresas de 
manufacturas, especialmente aquellas de mayor tamaño. El benefi cio de un marco 
regulatorio que fomenta la competencia en el sector servicios se extiende a los mercados 
internacionales. Entre 1991 y 2007, las reformas en servicios habrían permitido a las 
grandes compañías industriales españolas incrementar sus exportaciones reales de bienes 
alrededor de un 22 % en términos acumulados, a lo largo de este período, frente a un 
hipotético escenario sin reformas. Más aun, si se hubiera producido la convergencia en 
materia regulatoria al marco de mejores prácticas en 2007, el volumen de exportación de 
las grandes empresas hubiera sido un 10 % superior, en términos acumulados, frente al 
valor observado. No obstante, no se observa evidencia robusta de este efecto en el caso 
de las pymes. El estudio muestra que el tamaño de la empresa es relevante para estudiar el 
vínculo que existe entre las reformas regulatorias, los precios de los consumos intermedios 
y el volumen de exportación.
Palabras clave: regulación en servicios, precios de los consumos intermedios, exportaciones, 
tamaño de empresa.
Códigos JEL: L11, L43, F14.
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1. Introduction
The study of the effects of anti-competitive service sector regulation on economic perfor-
mance has gained recent attention in the literature. Among OECD countries, regulation in
services remained high for much of the second-half of the past century, until the 1990s
when a decisive move to deregulate gathered momentum. This process involved the
progressive removal of the rules preventing competition in those service markets that
could operate in more competitive environments. Within this framework, new studies
have focused on the impact of service regulation on downstream activities, especially on
manufacturing (e.g., Barone and Cingano, 2011, and Arnold et al., 2011). Given their direct
and increasing dependence on key service inputs, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that the performance of manufacturing firms might be particularly affected by an anti-
competitive regulatory set-up in services. Furthermore, the consumption of an expanded
variety of intermediates as part of the manufacturing global value-added chain inevitably
raises the economic relevance of service regulation (OECD et al., 2013). For example,
Barone and Cingano (2011) find that countries with better service regulations experience
faster value added, productivity and export growth in those manufacturing industries
that use services more intensively. Arnold et al. (2011) conclude that foreign entry into
services is the channel through which services liberalization contributes to the improved
TFP performance of manufacturing firms. Bourlès et al. (2013) show that the lack of
competition in upstream services curbs productivity improvements across all downstream
sectors, especially in those that are close to the technological frontier. Very recently, Arnold
et al. (2015) use a panel of Indian firms to find a significant empirical link between progress
in services reforms and manufacturing productivity. Similarly, Maican and Orth (2015)
evaluate the influence of local market entry regulations in the productivity of Swedish
retail industry at the store level.
Theoretically, one of the connections of service sector regulation and firm perfor-
mance may operate via the negotiated terms and conditions of exchange between service
suppliers and manufacturing producers or, more specifically, via the price of intermediate
inputs. If deregulation brings more competition to upstream markets and/or shifts the
distribution of bargaining power in favor of downstream firms, theory suggests that the
associated fall in equilibrium input prices would produce a pro-competitive cost effect
that otherwise would be absent (e.g., Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). Empirically, however, it
remains to be shown that service sector deregulation influences the price of intermediate
consumption paid by manufacturing firms.1 The existence of such empirical connection
1 The two related analyses in the literature have focused on production prices at the industry level, where
transmission channels are not disentangled. Barone and Cingano (2011) estimate the effects of regulation on
industry prices among OECD countries and find that lower service regulation translates into lower prices in
manufacturing industries that are service intensive. Similarly, a simulation exercise in Cette et al. (2014) shows
a positive and significant correlation between changes in production prices and changes in service regulations
using OECD country-industry data.
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would raise at least two important questions. First, does the impact of service sector
regulation on input prices depend on downstream firm characteristics? And, second,
does the beneficial cost effect of service deregulation show up in downstream outcomes
uniformly across firms? The first question is concerned with the differential impact of
deregulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms and the second with the distinct
strategic response of firms to the benefits brought about by deregulation.
The aim of this paper is to address these issues and, in so doing, contribute to the
literature in three relevant ways. First, taking advantage of an unusually rich database
with detailed price information reported by manufacturing firms in Spain, we test the
theoretical prediction that service sector deregulation reduces the price of intermediate
inputs paid by firms. Second, we explore whether, in the face of deregulation, firm size
is relevant for the link between services reforms and intermediate input prices. That is,
we consider the possibility of, for example, services providers competing more (or less)
intensively to secure larger manufacturing contracts. Third, since the beneficial cost effect
of deregulation may show more evidently where the competitiveness strength of firms is
most tried, we investigate the connection between service sector regulation and manu-
facturing exports at the firm level. We do so in an empirical framework whose aim is to
identify the effect of regulation on exports that operates through the price of intermediate
consumption. Once again, we address the potentially distinct response to deregulation of
firms of heterogeneous size. Throughout the analysis, we bring out the relevance of firm
size for the link between services reforms and manufacturing firm performance. Thus,
one of the ultimate goals of the paper is to inform international trade models of firm
heterogeneity by gathering robust evidence on the economic mechanisms that underlie
trade flows (e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).
The manufacturing firms in our dataset are classified in 10 industries for the period
1991-2010. For each manufacturing firm, we have information on intermediate input
prices, production prices, size, investment, financial health, export sales and a rich set of
other variables that, among other things, allow the estimation of TFP at the firm level. We
construct an annual indicator of service sector regulation that proxies the impact on man-
ufacturing industries of anti-competitive restrictions in the markets for energy, transport,
communication and professional services. The indicator combines information on service
regulations, from the OECD Non-Manufacturing Regulation (NMR) databases, and on
service dependence by manufacturing industry, from the input-output account matrices.2
We devise a two-step econometric approach that, in the first step, explores the connection
2 The methodological approach to construct the service sector indicator is consistent with Barone and Cingano
(2011) and Bourlès et al. (2013).
between the price of intermediate inputs and service sector regulation and, in the second,
identifies the impact of regulation on exports that works through the price of intermediate
consumption. The identification method uses the regulatory impact indicator as an exter-
nal instrument in the export equation and adopts an incremental estimation approach that
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addresses endogeneity concerns. Finally, we carry out quantitative simulation exercises
and extensive robustness checks.
At this stage, two methodological points are worth mentioning. First, unlike pre-
vious studies, we use a measure of real exports at the firm level. This is critical in order
to correctly estimate the economic impact of service regulation since the combined effect
of lower regulation on prices and quantities will tend to understate its impact on nominal
values (Barone and Cingano, 2011).3 Second, as the estimation period spans over fifteen
years, we also control for lagged export volumes in the export equation which, together
with the inclusion of input prices and firm level attributes, raises important concerns re-
garding endogeneity. We address this potential endogeneity problem estimating a System
GMM and testing the validity of our instruments, as recommended in Roodman (2009).4
Overall, by examining the experience of Spanish manufacturers over the 1990s and
2000s, we assess whether removing anti-competitive barriers to the provision of key ser-
vices has a non-negligible, beneficial impact on the price of intermediate inputs paid by
firms and on their volume of foreign sales. In this respect, Spain is an interesting case to
study since it is not only one of the OECD countries that reformed the most over the sam-
ple period, but it recorded a remarkably stable share of exports in GDP at the back of an
unprecedented expansion of construction and real estate activities. This domestic-driven
expansion drew on a large quantity of domestic resources and underpinned competitive-
ness losses. Services reforms may have held the key to support export performance during
the boom years. In a wider macroeconomic context, this is a very relevant and timely
topic as the recommendations to improve market functioning in advanced economies have
consistently ranked high in the policy portfolio of international institutions during the
recent crisis (OECD, 2014).
Considering that Spain undertook major services reforms in the period of study,
our results provide compelling evidence that the removal of barriers to competition in
3 As already noted, our database provides unusually detailed price information at the firm level which makes
it possible to compute real exports by deflating nominal export values with a price index of output. Most empir-
ical studies on firm heterogeneity and trade use a measure of either nominal exports, export shares or nominal
exports deflated by an industry-wide deflator (see, e.g., Berman and Héricourt, 2010, Minetti and Zhu, 2011, Bas,
2014, and Lodefalk, 2014). Compositional effects make deflating firm’s exports with an industry-wide price in-
dex clearly suboptimal while using export shares in the main specification would address the differential impact
of the explanatory variables on domestic sales vis-à-vis export sales, which is not the focus of our paper.
4 We also report the results of other panel estimators, such as OLS with fixed effects, and discuss methodolog-
ical issues related to sample selection bias.
services reduced the inflation rate of intermediate consumption faced by manufacturing
producers. Furthermore, we find that firm size is relevant for the link between services
reforms and intermediate input prices, such that deregulation produces more benefits
when downstream firms are large. Similarly, we find robust evidence of an input cost
channel through which service regulations affect the volume of exports of large firms,
while the evidence is lacking when firms are small or medium-sized. The relevance of
this channel is economically meaningful: simulation exercises of our full empirical model
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1707
suggest that, from 1991 till 2007, large firms increased their volume of exports by an
average of 22 per cent as a result of the input cost effect of services reforms, such that the
firms that benefited the most typically belonged to industries more dependent on service
inputs. In addition, if Spain had converged to the ‘best practice’ service regulations by the
end of the sample period, the volume of exports of large corporations would have been
raised by a further 9.8 per cent, on average. The results are robust to the inclusion of other
industry-level explanatory factors considered in the literature, e.g., the level of financial
depth and trends in world manufacturing exports.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
channels through which service sector regulation affects intermediate input prices and
export performance from the perspective of the firm. This section also presents evidence
on the level of regulation observed in OECD countries over the 1990s and 2000s. Section
3 describes the data and the empirical strategy, while Section 4 discusses the empirical
results. Section 5 provides a number of illustrative simulations carried out on the basis
of the preferred specifications. Section 6 presents robustness analysis and the last section
concludes.
2. Theoretical mechanisms and the OECD experience
2.1 Anti-competitive service regulations, intermediate input prices and downstream
firms’ foreign sales
Starting with the early work of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), the industrial organization
literature has explored the effects on industry equilibrium of the lack of competition in
the market for inputs. Market imperfections in the form of entry barriers lead to non-
competitive solutions in upstream markets, where input prices are often determined by
a bargaining process between suppliers and producers. Furthermore, as a result of irre-
versible investments, downstream firms may be locked into bilateral monopoly relations
with providers, which may make pro-competitive reforms more challenging to deliver.
In this context, the literature has shown that the equilibrium input price varies with the
structure of the upstream industry. In their classic paper, Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
established that more competition in the market for inputs yields lower bargained input
prices when downstream firms compete in imperfect substitutes. Several papers in this
tradition have deepened our understanding of the consequences on downstream firms’
outcomes of an imperfectly competitive set-up in input markets (see, e.g., Correa-López
and Naylor, 2004, and Correa-López, 2007).
Due to an increased interest on the functioning of services economies, the literature
has placed a renewed effort to explore the economic impact of vertical relations articulated
around the link between service providers and downstream producers. For example,
Barone and Cingano (2011) develop a simple framework where lower regulation increases
the share of service inputs whose price is determined under perfect competition while it
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reduces the share of service inputs whose price is set unilaterally by a monopolist. In
a model with two production technologies, the relative cost advantage of lower service
regulation shifts the equilibrium allocation of production and trade in favor of those indus-
tries that use services more intensively. In addition to the direct impact on the upstream
market structure, lower regulation may influence the distribution of bargaining power
in input price negotiations. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) incorporate this transmission
channel in an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model to study the effect of labor
market deregulation on real wages and employment. Bourlès et al. (2013) present a ‘neo-
Schumpeterian’ growth model where regulations that curb market competition upstream
alter the incentive structure for efficiency improvements downstream, as the expected
rents from innovation would have to be shared with intermediate input suppliers. Thus,
the higher the bargaining power of upstream firms, the larger the share of the downstream
rents appropriated by suppliers via higher negotiated input prices. In their framework,
the bargaining power of suppliers decreases with the intensity of competition in upstream
sectors, and so does the negotiated input price. The relationship between regulations,
prices and productivity is further explored in Cette et al. (2014).
Analytically, it is well-established that removing upstream barriers to competition
lowers equilibrium input prices, providing downstream producers with a pro-competitive
cost effect that otherwise would be absent. Furthermore, lowering regulatory barriers in,
for example, services may generate spillover effects to the price of other manufacturing
inputs, such as raw materials and intermediate goods, whose production and trade rely
heavily on services. This compound beneficial effect on input prices may prove relevant
for firm performance in foreign markets, where competition pressures are often at their
highest. Therefore, from an empirical perspective, the first hypothesis that we test is
whether a more competitive input market environment reduces the price of intermediate
inputs paid by downstream firms, and the second is whether it increases their volume of
exports.
Furthermore, for a given level of regulation, the distribution of bargaining power
in input price negotiations may be influenced by downstream firm characteristics. Large
firms, for example, may be able to secure better terms and conditions in their negotiations
with input suppliers while SMEs may encounter more restrictions on bargaining condi-
tions or may even have to act as price-takers. In this context, deregulation would shift the
distribution of bargaining power in favor of large manufacturers, as upstream suppliers
compete more intensively to secure sizeable contracts. Hence, the beneficial cost effect of
lower service regulation would be more evident when downstream firms are large. By
splitting the sample in two separate size categories, we effectively test whether the impact
of deregulation varies with firm size.
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2.2 Service sector reform in OECD countries
In the late 1980s, the service sectors of advanced economies remained highly sheltered
from competition, with some notable exceptions such as the US case. Competitive pres-
sures were halted by a set of regulations preventing entry into key non-manufacturing
input markets which could have otherwise operated in more competition-prone envi-
ronments. In the 1990s and 2000s, service sector deregulation gathered momentum and
countries engaged on a deregulatory path at a varying pace. To facilitate the study of
the economic consequences of an anti-competitive regulatory framework in services, the
OECD has recently produced a quantitative measure of its knock-on effects.5 In partic-
ular, the OECD Regulation Impact Indicator (RII) measures “the potential costs of anti-
competitive regulation in selected non-manufacturing sectors on sectors of the economy
that use the output of non-manufacturing sectors as intermediate inputs in the production
process”. The RII combines country-specific information on both the level of regulation
in various service activities and the extent and composition of service dependence across
manufacturing, to produce an indicator that is specific to each manufacturing industry.6
For a sample of 20 OECD countries, Figure 1 illustrates the level of the RII of four
manufacturing sectors in two points in time. Note that a higher value of the indicator
captures higher potential costs of anti-competitive service regulation. Albeit the extent
and composition of service dependence may vary somewhat across advanced economies,
the figure shows that Spain is one of the countries that deregulated the most since 1991.7
5 See Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
6 The vintage of the RII that we use is available at an annual frequency for the period 1975-2007. Service
dependence is obtained from country-specific input-output tables for the year 2000. The database, together with
a methodological note on its construction, can be found at: http://www.oecd.org.
7 A similar pattern is observed for the remaining manufacturing industries not shown in the figure. Next
section presents a variant of the OECD RII that is more suitable for our estimation purposes and provides further
details on the construction of the indicators.
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Figure 1: The OECD Regulation Impact Indicator, selected manufacturing sectors, 1991-2007.
3. Data and econometric strategy
3.1 Firm-level dataset and sample
The source of firm-level data is the Encuesta sobre Estatregias Empresariales (ESEE), an an-
nual survey conducted by the Fundación SEPI. This provides detailed information on com-
panies that have operated in the Spanish manufacturing sector since the launch of the
survey in 1990. In the base year, all firms that employed more than 200 employees (large
firms) were asked to participate while firms with 10 to 200 employees (SMEs) were sur-
veyed according to a random sampling scheme. Participation rates reached approximately
70% of the population of large firms and close to 5% of the population of SMEs. The same
selective sampling scheme was applied to each industry in the base year. In subsequent
years, entry of newly created firms and recorded exits have maintained the initial sample
properties. Using this data, Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004) study the influence on pro-
ductivity growth of process innovation at different firm ages while Cassiman et al. (2010)
explore how the relationship between productivity and entry into exporting is mediated
by product and process innovation.
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The manufacturing firms in our dataset are classified in 10 industries during the
period 1991-2010.8 For each manufacturing industry, we obtain a firm-level TFP estimate
using the Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) control function approach. Before TFP estimation,
we follow a number of steps to clean the sample. We exclude firms with only one year
of data available. We drop firm-year observations that do not have a complete record
of the variables needed to estimate TFP. In addition, we remove observations where the
ratios of labor cost to sales or material cost to sales are larger than unity and, finally,
we exclude firms at the top and bottom 1% of the capital-output and the capital-labor
distributions.9 The total sample comprises 29,137 observations covering information on
3,540 firms arranged in an unbalanced panel observed annually with an average of 8
observations per firm. Of the total 29,137 observations, 8,980 correspond to firms of large
size and 20,157 to firms of small to medium size. In the Appendix, Table A.1 contains
detailed information on sample distribution by size and Table A.2 summarizes the results
of the TFP estimation.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables of interest. The
period of analysis is 1991-2007 since the availability of the regulation indicator will restrict
the information we draw from our sample to that period.10 The variable exports is mea-
sured by the ratio of foreign sales over a firm-specific price index of output. At this point,
it is worth noting how individual firms report both input and output prices in the survey.
Information on prices is expressed in growth rates from which we back out a price index
with the base year of 1989.11 Nominal values are then deflated by the corresponding price
index to obtain a proxy measure for real (constant price) values. Capital intensity refers
to the capital-labor ratio and size is proxied by the number of employees. The rate of
price variation of intermediate consumption encompasses the prices of energy, services,
raw materials and other components. A self-reported measure of market power in the
main market (to a large extent, the domestic market) is given by the market share variable.
Financial health is captured by the leverage ratio, computed as the value of long-term
debt with financial institutions divided by own funds. Foreign ownership is measured as
foreign participation in a firm’s equity while age refers to the number of years since the
establishment of the firm. Table 1 shows that, on average, large firms export more, are
8 The ordered names of the industries figure in Table A.1 of the Appendix.
9 Typically, these cleaning rules are used to eliminate outliers from the data due to, e.g., very large mergers,
extraordinary firm shocks or coding errors. Note that, after applying these exclusion rules, the representativeness
of the sample by industry remains virtually unchanged.
10 At the time of estimation, the vintage of the OECD NMR database run annually until 2007. For futher details,
see the text further below.
11 Price data is available in the survey since 1990.
more efficient and capital intensive, and are less leveraged and older than SMEs. They
also face a lower inflation rate in intermediates, and have more market power and foreign
presence in their ownership structure.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1707
Table 1. Summary statistics, 1991-2007
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Exports (in logs) 14.45 2.66 16.21 1.81 12.89 2.31
TFP (in logs) 2.52 1.31 2.69 1.50 2.44 1.20
Capital intensity (in logs) 9.92 1.05 10.54 0.85 9.61 1.00
Size (in logs) 4.34 1.51 6.13 0.71 3.46 0.91
Price of intermediate consumption (%) 3.88 6.61 3.33 6.14 4.15 6.80
Market share in main market (%) 12.31 20.32 20.25 22.94 8.71 17.89
Leverage ratio 2.72 299.64 0.63 12.83 3.73 364.64
Age (in logs) 2.83 0.94 3.27 0.86 2.62 0.91
Foreign ownership (%) 18.40 37.21 40.77 46.87 7.74 25.40
Note: See the text and the notes to Table A.2 for a further description of the variables.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.
SMEsTotal sample Large firms
3.2 Industry-level regulation indicators
The indicator that measures the impact of the regulatory environment in the upstream
market for service inputs on downstream manufacturing (REGjt) is constructed from two






where j refers to the manufacturing industry, t denotes the year and s refers to the up-
stream service input.
In Eq. (1), Zst encompasses the regulatory indexes of four upstream service activi-
ties: energy (electricity and gas), transport (air, road and rail), communication (telecom
and post) and professional services (accountancy, architecture, engineering and legal),
drawn from the OECD NMR databases.12 The index on the regulatory environment of
each service activity quantifies information on ex-ante anti-competitive restrictions in the
market for that particular service, measured by the extent of entry barriers, the degree
12 The regulatory indexes of energy, transport and communication are used, at an annual frequency, for the
period 1975-2007. The indicator of professional services is available for three years: 1996, 2003, 2008. In this
case, we have assumed constancy of the index at its 1996 value for the 1991-1995 period and we have linearly
intrapolated the missing observations for the rest of the sample. Note that, unlike the OECD RII, REGjt does not
include retail trade, as a relevant service input provider to downstream manufacturing, and banking.
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of vertical integration and market conduct.13 A lower value of the regulatory index Zst
indicates a service market environment more exposed to competitive pressures.
The weight ω js in Eq. (1) captures industry j dependence on each regulated service
s. Based on information obtained from the OECD Input-Output database, we produce
two measures of ω js that differ in the extent of the direct and indirect linkages of service
s to industry j accounted for in each measure. Our benchmark of ‘direct’ dependence
is given by the technical coefficients of the input-output table, which are computed as
the ratio of the cost of each service input s to the value of output produced in industry
j. ‘Direct and indirect’ dependence is retrieved from the inverse Leontieff matrix and
the industry shares of value added in production, and accounts for both the direct and
indirect contributions of service s to the value of output produced in industry j.14 Since the
measure of service dependence should reflect the true technological requirements of each
manufacturing industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), we choose as a benchmark the input-
output table of the US economy for the year 2000. Adopting the input-output structure of
a second country with a low level of anti-competitive service regulation is often done in
the literature to address an important source of endogeneity that emerges from domestic
regulatory policy (Bourlès et al., 2010; Barone and Cingano, 2011).15 For comparative
purposes, we also construct a measure of REGjt that uses the direct weights of Spain’s
input-output matrix for the year 2000.
13 Barriers to entry hinder competition in a market that otherwise could operate in a competitive environment.
There are barriers to entry when: (i) restrictions apply on the number of firms that may operate in a market
(e.g., the telecom sector, the post service, the freight transport rail market, or the domestic airline service); (ii)
licensing policies may limit industry capacity (e.g., road freight transport, professional services); (iii) third party
access to the electricity and gas transmission grids is limited; (iv) there is no liberalised wholesale market for
electricity; (v) consumer choice of electricity and gas suppliers is hampered by consumption thresholds; (vi) etc.
Vertical integration is mainly concerned with the degree of market separation between the generation/import
and the supply/distribution segments of the electricity and gas industries, as competitive pressures can be higher
if each segment constitutes a separate market. Market conduct applies to professional services and refers to
restrictions on prices and fees, advertising, the form of business and inter-professional cooperation. Finally,
notice that, unlike the OECD RII, REGjt excludes measures concerned with the ex-post enforcement of regulation
and privatization policies, such as the extent of public ownership and the prevailing market structure. For a
detailed description of the OECD NMR indicators, see Conway and Nicoletti (2006).
14 Due to intersectoral dependence, a unit of final demand in industry j will have direct and indirect reper-
cussions on the production of other sectors, which in turn make use of service inputs. Anti-competitive service
regulation thus has direct and indirect channels through which to affect industry j production. For further details
on how to obtain the direct and indirect weights from the input-output tables, see Barone and Cingano (2011).
15 In this case, the measuremente error could be non-classical and the endogeneity bias could be of either sign
(Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2006). Note that even adopting the input-output table of a country with no anti-
competitive regulation would not preclude the possibility of other relevant sources of bias. Bias may result from
service dependence being determined by other factors in addition to technological ones, e.g., country-specific
shocks, that are unrelated to firm exports (“attenuation” bias). For the period 1975-2007, the US economy exhib-
ited, on average, the lowest level of regulation among OECD countries, which potentially minimizes measure-
ment error. Finally, notice that, unlike REGjt, the weights of the OECD RII are constructed from the domestic
country input-ouput table and that, in so doing, the direct and indirect measure is used.
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Figure 2: Spain: REGjt by manufacturing sector (based on US I/O Table for year 2000, direct dependence).
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the benchmark REGjt for each manufacturing
sector. The variability shown across sectors and over time reflects differences in the extent
of service sector dependence of each industry, in the composition of the input services
used, and in the initial level and pace of deregulation of each service. As noticed from
Figure A.3. in the Appendix, deregulation was especially pronounced in the energy sector,
followed by transport, communication and, to a lesser extent, professional services, while
manufacturing dependence on professional services and transport has become increas-
ingly relevant.
3.3 Econometric strategy
We implement a two-step econometric approach in order to identify the effect of regulation
on exports that works through the price of intermediate consumption. In the first step,
we thoroughly explore the connection between the price of intermediate consumption
paid by the firm and service sector regulation. As we shall see below, we estimate two
types of price specifications, in levels and differences. This step allows us to evaluate
whether service regulation might be considered as a strongly informative instrument for
intermediate input prices in the system GMM estimated in the second step. Throughout
the analysis, services reforms are treated as exogenous and brought forward from EU-wide
directives and initiatives. In the second step, we regress the firm’s foreign sales on the
price of intermediate consumption. In light of the results of the first step, we instrument
the price of intermediate consumption with the regulatory impact indicator. We check for
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instrument validity and informativeness by adopting an incremental approach whereby
the baseline specification is extended with additional determinants and estimated using
alternative methods while addressing endogeneity issues.
In the first step, we regress the annual rate of variation in the price of intermediate
consumption paid by manufacturing firms (gPICit ) on the change of the regulatory impact
indicator (ΔREGjt) and a set of controls:






jt + β5recessionit (2)
+η j + λt + μi + εit,
where subscript i refers to the firm and subscripts {j, t} are defined as in Eq. (1). Notice that
parameter β1 would capture the overall effect of deregulation on the price of intermediate
consumption, that is, the direct effect on services and energy prices and the indirect effect
on raw materials and other components prices. To improve identification, Eq. (2) controls
for three industry-level determinants whose variation may drive the price of intermediate
consumption, especially of its raw materials and other intermediates components.16 To
proxy for the evolution of exogenous technological factors, we use the rate of change in
the price of intermediate inputs recorded in US manufacturing (gPIC_USjt ). The influence
of global demand pressures is controlled for by the world’s growth rate of real exports in
manufacturing (gX_WORLDjt ). Import price inflation of intermediate goods (g
PMIG
jt ) accounts
for external and domestic drivers pertaining to Spanish manufacturing. Alternatively,
we use the price of imported raw materials as a control.17 Cyclical factors at the firm
level are captured by a dummy variable (recessionit) that takes the value of 1 if the firm
reports a recessionary main market in year t and 0 otherwise. The specification also
includes industry dummies (η j), time dummies (λt), firm-level fixed effects that account
for unobserved heterogeneity (μi) and an idiosyncratic error component (εit). We use the
fixed effects and the random effects estimators to derive results that exploit all sources of
variability in the data. We start by running regressions on the total sample and, then, we
work separately with the observations of large firms and SMEs.
The second price specification regresses the logarithm of the price index of interme-
16 Due to data limitations, the list is not exhaustive. For example, recent trends in offshoring, global competi-
tion and product quality upgrading may not be fully captured by our technology-, demand- and supply-driven
proxies, which may overstate the impact of regulation on intermediate input prices. We interpret the results with
this caveat in mind.
17 The data sources used to construct the three industry-level variables are World KLEMS, OECD, WTO and
Spain’s Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness.
diate consumption on the same set of variables considered above, as given by:
ln PICit = α0 + α1REGjt_b89 + α2 ln P
IC_US
jt + α3 ln X
WORLD
jt_b89 + α4 ln P
MIG
jt (3)
+α5recessionit + η j + λt + μi + εit,
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where the price indexes are referenced to the base year of 1989, the regulatory impact
indicator is written in terms of the absolute change since 1989 and world’s exports are
expressed as a ratio to the corresponding 1989 value. The rest of the controls are defined
as in Eq. (2) as well as the estimators and the estimation samples.
In the second step, we explore the link between service sector regulation and man-
ufacturing firm’s foreign sales. The aim is to identify whether regulatory reform affects
firms’ exports through a cost channel on intermediate input prices. The full empirical
model takes the following form:
ln xit = α+ β ln xit−1 + γ ln PICit + δΠit + η j + λt + μi + εit, (4)
where x denotes deflated exports. In Eq. (4), the lagged dependent variable accounts for
past export performance at the firm level and ln PICit is the logarithm of the price index of
intermediate consumption.18 Πit is a vector of controls for firm characteristics that may
include TFP, size, capital intensity, market share, leverage, age of the firm and a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the firm is fully owned by a foreign multinational corporation in
year t (and 0 otherwise).19 Eq. (4) also includes industry dummies (η j) and time dummies
(λt). Finally, the composite disturbance has two orthogonal components: fixed effects (μi)
that control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and an idiosyncratic error (εit).
In Eq. (4), our identification strategy consists of evaluating how the use of the
regulatory impact indicator as an external instrument influences the coefficient on the price
of intermediate consumption (γ). We check for changes in coefficient size and significance
both in a baseline model that omits firm attributes and in the full empirical model. As
an illustrative starting point, we first report the results of the OLS fixed-effects estimator.
Then, we employ the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator due to
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) as a better estimation strategy
in our case. The system GMM estimator effectively controls for the potential endogene-
ity of introducing lagged export volumes, input prices and firm-level characteristics in
18 As it will become clear later, the discussion of the results is done in terms of short-run impacts or elasticities,
unless otherwise specified.
19 Notice that we assume exogeneity of multinational corporation status to the level of regulation. The motives
that lead a company to shift production abroad are varied and have been extensively addressed in the literature:
models of vertical FDI emphasize the factor prices advantage (e.g., Helpman, 1984, and Yeaple, 2003), while
models of horizontal FDI consider the proximity-concentration trade-off (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 2000, and
Helpman et al., 2004) or the relevance of labor market institutions (Mukherjee, 2008).
the specification.20 A common problem of applying system GMM is that of instrument
proliferation. Too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and fail to remove
their endogeneous components. To limit the risk of instrument proliferation, we carefully
20 The firm-level attributes that are considered potentially endogenous in the exports equation are TFP, size,
capital intensity, market share and leverage. We use the xtabond2 command in Stata 14 to implement the System
GMM. This command allows us to separately specify how the external instrument enters the equation in differ-
ences and the equation in levels, hence we exploit the results of the estimation of Eqs. (2) and (3) to inform how
REGjt instruments the model of Eq. (4).
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restrict the number of lags to use as instruments for each endogenous variable and we
collapse the instrument matrices, as proposed by Roodman (2009). Note that because Eq.
(4) includes the dependent variable lagged once, the estimation sample covers the years
1992-2007.
We run separate regressions for two subsamples of exporters: large firms and SMEs.
Exporters are defined as those firms that exported in all the years in which they are present
in the sample.21 This definition is in line with the continuous exporters definition used
in Greenaway et al. (2007).22 The total number of exporters’ observations (11,339) is
reduced due to the combined attrition exercise from size status and sample years. In
the baseline model, the subsample of large exporters contains 4,498 observations and the
subsample of exporting SMEs comprises 3,877 observations. Note that a relevant source
of sample selection bias may arise from the omission of firms that report zero export
values. Given that the majority of large manufacturing firms are exporters, this source
of bias may be confined to the case of exporting SMEs. According to our transmission
mechanism, a bias would exist if, in the context of services reforms, the determination of
the price of intermediates is mediated by the export status of the firm, aside from, and
independently of, its size. If present, however, the sign of the bias is an open question
as exporting SMEs may not unequivocally benefit more from deregulation if compared to
non-exporting SMEs.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Service regulations and the price of intermediate inputs
Table 2 presents the results obtained from the estimation of Eqs. (2) and (3) in our panel
of manufacturing firms. For the total sample, the results suggest a positive and a very
significant relationship between the rate of variation in the price of intermediate inputs
21 Of the total 29,137 observations, 11,339 correspond to 1,752 exporters, out of which 647 are large firms, 848
are SMEs and 257 are size-switchers. Note that firms that change size category in the years in which they are
present in the sample are not part of the subsamples used for estimation.
22 Therefore, it excludes those firms that switch from non-exporting to exporting, and vice versa, over the
sample period.
and the change in the regulatory impact indicator. Considering that Spain undertook
major services reforms in the period of study, the estimates indicate that the removal of
barriers to competition in services reduced the inflation rate of intermediate consumption
faced by manufacturers. Likewise, the regulatory reforms in services exerted a downward
pressure in the price level of intermediate consumption. In terms of magnitude, the first
two columns of Panel I suggest that increasing the deregulatory effort by 0.1 reduces input
price inflation by an average of 2 percentage points. The magnitude of the effect appears
to vary across observations of different firm sizes, with an average effect of 2.6 percentage
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Table 2. Service regulations and intermediate input prices, 1991-2007
Panel I. Dep. variable: Rate of variation
in the price of intermediate consumption
?REG 0.184*** 0.228*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 0.181*** 0.224***
[0.040] [0.036] [0.073] [0.062] [0.053] [0.045]
Variation in U.S. input prices 0.261*** 0.312*** 0.369*** 0.405*** 0.217*** 0.278***
[0.036] [0.034] [0.063] [0.061] [0.044] [0.042]
Variation in world real exports 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.022** 0.022*** 0.015** 0.017***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Variation in import prices 0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Recession -0.003** -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Panel II. Dep. variable: Logarithm of
the price of intermediate consumption
REG 0.489*** 0.518*** 0.664*** 0.523*** 0.213 0.489***
[0.139] [0.095] [0.179] [0.155] [0.191] [0.113]
U.S. input prices 0.672*** 0.636*** 0.889*** 0.746*** 0.296** 0.447***
[0.109] [0.092] [0.161] [0.147] [0.135] [0.110]
World real exports 0.020 0.033** -0.041 0.017 0.121*** 0.060***
[0.029] [0.016] [0.042] [0.027] [0.036] [0.020]
Import prices 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Recession -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Notes: All specifications include a constant term, time and industry dummies; *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level;
robust standard errors figure in brackets. The REG indicator is based on the benchmark input-output table. See the text for detailed variable description.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.













points in the case of large firms (columns 3 and 4) and of 2 percentage points in the case of
SMEs (columns 5 and 6). Furthermore, as columns 3 to 6 of Panel II show, services reforms
exercised a significantly greater downward pressure on the price level of intermediate
consumption when downstream manufacturers were large. On the other hand, the rate of
variation in the price of intermediate inputs of US manufacturing, in world real exports
and in import prices are positively and significantly correlated with the inflation rate of
intermediate consumption. These results indicate the presence of technology-, supply- and
demand-side drivers of intermediate input prices, out of which, the price of intermediate
inputs in US manufacturing had the largest influence, as confirmed in Panel II of Table 2.
Finally, a firm that declares a recessionary main market exerts a downward pressure on
the price variation of its intermediates. The results are generally robust to the measure
of REGjt that uses alternative weights, especially for the case of large firms, and to the
inclusion of the price of imported raw materials.23
23 Robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
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Overall, our results provide compelling evidence that service sector deregulation
reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid by firms and that firm size is relevant for the
link between services reforms and intermediate input prices. Since the pro-competitive
cost effect of deregulation is stronger for large firms than for SMEs, we postulate that the
impact of service regulations on firm’s exports is more evident when firms are large.
4.2 Service regulations and large firms’ exports
The first three columns of Table 3 present the baseline results obtained from the estimation
of Eq. (4). Once endogeneity concerns are addressed, the baseline model shows a negative
and significant effect of the price of intermediate consumption on the volume of exports
of large manufacturers. Furthermore, the inclusion of the regulatory impact indicator
as an external instrumental variable raises the coefficient estimate and its significance
while the exogeneity tests indicate that the model is well-specified. A similar pattern is
observed in the results of the full empirical model. Column 4 shows that, on this occasion,
the fixed effects estimator captures a negative and significant relationship between the
input price and the volume of exports. Likewise, the estimates that figure in columns
5 and 6 indicate that, once the REG instrument is included, the coefficient of interest
increases while the significance level and the relevant exogeneity tests improve. According
to the estimates in column 6, the long-run elasticity of exports to the price of intermediate
consumption stands at 1.25 per cent. Thus, the evidence suggests that there is an input cost
channel through which services reforms affect large firms’ exports. With regard to other
determinants, we find that size and, especially, TFP have a positive and significant effect on
foreign sales. On the other hand, we find a negative association between the age of the firm
and exports which might reflect an outward-looking expansion strategy among younger
firms. The results also suggest that, once we control for all other firm attributes, capital
intensity, multinational status, the market share in the firm’s main market and its long-
term leverage with financial institutions are not significantly associated with the volume
of exports. Regarding the latter, it may be the case that long-term leverage with financial
institutions is the channel through which firms finance the large fixed costs associated to
long-term investment projects or entry into export markets, while it is unrelated to the
variable costs of selling abroad.24
24 These include shipping, duties and cross-border insurance, in addition, exporters have higher working cap-
ital needs due to longer time lags between production and payments. The results reported in Table 3 might be in
line with the sunk costs hypothesis that ascribes a more relevant effect of firm’s financial health on trade at the
time of firm’s entry into exporting, i.e., on the extensive margin of exports (Berman and Héricourt, 2010).
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Table 3. Service regulation and large firms’ foreign sales, 1992-2007
Dep. variable: Log exports
(1) OLS with (2) System (3) System (4) OLS with (5) System (6) System
fixed effects GMM GMM fixed effects GMM GMM
Regressors
Log exports (t-1) 0.397*** 0.434*** 0.541*** 0.330*** 0.338*** 0.340***
[0.056] [0.087] [0.102] [0.058] [0.085] [0.086]
Input price (in logs) -0.119 -0.354** -0.568** -0.354** -0.720*** -0.822***
[0.145] [0.181] [0.238] [0.165] [0.243] [0.265]
External IV: NO NO YES NO NO YES
Additional regressors: NO NO NO YES YES YES
TFP (in logs) 0.727*** 1.273*** 1.248***
[0.117] [0.410] [0.380]
Size (in logs) 0.529*** 0.633* 0.685*
[0.074] [0.365] [0.360]
Capital intenstiy (in logs) 0.083 0.221 0.256
[0.056] [0.204] [0.190]
Market share -0.002** 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
Leverage 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
[0.001] [0.012] [0.014]
Age (in logs) -0.008 -0.083** -0.081**
[0.022] [0.039] [0.038]
MNC -0.053 0.063 0.049
[0.086] [0.062] [0.060]
Number of:
Observations 4498 4498 4498 3943 3943 3943
Groups 594 594 594 573 573 573
Instruments 30 34 44 46
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.32 (0.752) 0.32 (0.752) 0.02 (0.983) 0.04 (0.970)
Hansen test of overid. 0.05 (0.975) 3.38 (0.760) 1.97 (0.992) 2.29 (0.997)
Difference-in-Hansen tests:
GMM instruments for levels 0.05 (0.975) 2.03 (0.731) 1.24 (0.990) 1.57 (0.991)
Lagged exports 0.05 (0.975) 0.67 (0.716) 0.56 (0.754) 0.42 (0.810)
Input price 0.05 (0.975) 1.34 (0.512) 0.10 (0.953) 0.01 (0.994)
REG (level equation) 0.92 (0.630) 0.00 (0.983)
REG (difference equation) 0.23 (0.893) 0.31 (0.575)
TFP 0.09 (0.957) 0.08 (0.960)
Size 0.29 (0.863) 0.38 (0.827)
Capital intensity 0.40 (0.817) 0.44 (0.801)
Market share 0.17 (0.918) 0.12 (0.940)
Leverage 1.50 (0.827) 1.48 (0.831)
Notes: All specifications include a constant term, time and industry dummies; *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
Columns (1) & (4): OLS with fixed effects; robust standard errors (in brackets). Columns (2), (3), (5) & (6): Two-step efficient system GMM estimation;
Windmeijer-corrected  robust standard errors (in brackets); the test statistics are reported with p-values in parentheses. MNC refers to a multinational
corporation dummy. The REG indicator is based on the benchmark input-output table.
Source: Authors ’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.
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Table 4. Service regulation, input prices and large firms’ foreign sales: Disaggregated regulation impact indicators
Dep. variable: Rate of variation in the
price of intermediate consumption Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random Fixed Random
effects effects effects effects effects effects effects effects
?REG 0.641*** 0.617*** 0.185* 0.198** 2.434** 2.248** 0.273** 0.263***
[0.209] [0.198] [0.096] [0.081] [0.973] [0.946] [0.127] [0.085]
Regulation impact indicator in: Energy Energy Transport Transport Communication Communication Prof. services Prof. services
Additional regressors: YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dep. variable: Log exports
System System System System System System System System
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Log exports (t-1) 0.533*** 0.343*** 0.527*** 0.359*** 0.514*** 0.349*** 0.517*** 0.349***
[0.099] [0.088] [0.103] [0.087] [0.101] [0.087] [0.099] [0.089]
Input price (in logs) -0.631** -0.783*** -0.589** -0.857*** -0.669** -0.816*** -0.647** -0.797***
[0.276] [0.258] [0.253] [0.280] [0.274] [0.263] [0.261] [0.288]
External IV: Energy Energy Transport Transport Communication Communication Prof. services Prof. services
Additional regressors: NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.29 (0.768) 0.06 (0.953) 0.29 (0.775) 0.10 (0.921) 0.27 (0.790) 0.06 (0.951) 0.27 (0.788) 0.06 (0.956)
Hansen test of overid. 2.62 (0.623) 2.59 (0.995) 2.85 (0.827) 2.86 (0.992) 2.43 (0.658) 2.27 (0.997) 2.15 (0.709) 2.93 (0.992)
Notes: See the notes to Tables 2 and 3.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.
Our next set of results is presented in Table 4 where we separately consider the role
of each regulated service. The estimates of Eq. (2) show that services reforms pertaining
to all available categories reduced the inflation rate of intermediate consumption faced by
large manufacturers, although with some heterogeneity. In our sample period, the waves
of deregulation in the communication and energy sectors exerted the largest downward
pressure on input prices. Likewise, the evidence suggests that the input cost channel of
regulatory reforms is present across all service sectors, with a slightly larger impact of the
regulatory environment in air, road and rail transportation on the volume of exports.25
4.3 Service regulations and SMEs’ exports
In this section, we investigate whether there is an input cost channel through which ser-
vices reforms affect SMEs’ exports. Theory mechanisms suggest that, if present, this chan-
nel might be weaker than the one identified in the case of large firms. Columns 1 to 3 of
Table 5 present the results of the baseline model. Once endogeneity issues are controlled
25 Barone and Cingano (2011) found strong effects on value added growth of regulation in the provision of
energy and professional services.
for, the estimates capture a negative and significant effect of the price of intermediate
consumption on the volume of exports of SMEs. The point estimate and its significance
increase when the regulatory impact indicator is introduced as an external instrument.
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Table 5. Service regulation and SMEs’ foreign sales, 1992-2007
Dep. variable: Log exports
(1) OLS with (2) System (3) System (4) OLS with (5) System (6) System
fixed effects GMM GMM fixed effects GMM GMM
Regressors
Log exports (t-1) 0.482*** 0.465*** 0.480*** 0.407*** 0.352*** 0.371***
[0.027] [0.047] [0.047] [0.028] [0.064] [0.062]
Input price (in logs) -0.152 -0.410* -0.578** -0.712*** -0.863* -0.859*
[0.179] [0.235] [0.228] [0.159] [0.442] [0.450]
External IV: NO NO YES NO NO YES
Additional regressors: NO NO NO YES YES YES
TFP (in logs) 0.811*** 2.081*** 2.380***
[0.099] [0.708] [0.689]
Size (in logs) 0.667*** 0.989*** 0.892***
[0.080] [0.226] [0.204]
Capital intenstiy (in logs) 0.106** 0.292 0.246
[0.054] [0.207] [0.193]
Leverage 0.007 0.010 0.007
[0.005] [0.014] [0.013]
Age (in logs) -0.019 -0.120** -0.114**
[0.037] [0.056] [0.054]
MNC -0.129 -0.197 -0.190
[0.114] [0.169] [0.165]
Recession -0.087*** 0.784 1.076**
[0.034] [0.532] [0.459]
Number of establishments -0.173 -0.383*** -0.347***
[0.106] [0.109] [0.101]
Number of:
Observations 3877 3877 3877 3814 3629 3629
Groups 655 655 655 647 643 643
Instruments 30 32 51 53
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 3.38 (0.001) 3.42 (0.001) 1.46 (0.145) 1.23 (0.218)
Hansen test of overid. 0.08 (0.959) 2.30 (0.680) 13.6 (0.402) 14.6 (0.480)
Difference-in-Hansen tests:
GMM instruments for levels 0.08 (0.959) 1.96 (0.582) 5.44 (0.710) 7.05 (0.632)
Lagged exports 0.08 (0.959) 1.04 (0.595) 2.13 (0.345) 2.63 (0.269)
Input price 0.08 (0.959) 1.99 (0.369) 1.76 (0.415) 1.40 (0.496)
REG (level equation) 1.03 (0.311) 0.53 (0.465)
REG (difference equation) 0.77 (0.379) 0.37 (0.543)
TFP 2.42 (0.659) 2.24 (0.692)
Size 5.16 (0.523) 6.01 (0.422)
Capital intensity 4.00 (0.406) 2.80 (0.591)
Leverage 2.76 (0.599) 2.17 (0.705)
Notes: All specifications include a constant term, time and industry dummies; *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level.
Columns (2)-(3),(5)-(6): Two-step efficient system GMM estimation; Windmeijer-corrected  robust standard errors (in brackets); the test statistics are
reported with p-values in parentheses. Columns (1),(4): OLS with fixed effects; robust standard errors (in brackets). MNC refers to the multinational
corporation dummy. The dummy recession is instrumented with its own lag.  The REG indicator is based on the benchmark US input-output table.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.
However, despite the fact that the p-values of the Hansen and the difference-in-Hansen
tests for instrument validity exceed the ‘common sense’ threshold of 0.25 (Roodman, 2009),
the Arellano-Bond test suggests that lagged instruments are being made invalid through
autocorrelation.
The estimates of the full empirical model are presented in the last three columns
of Table 5. In particular, columns 5 and 6 show that the inclusion of REG as an external
instrument does not influence the coefficient on the input price. The regression in column
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6 performs relatively well on the overidentification tests, albeit one p-value is just above
the threshold of 0.25. Overall, we do not find robust evidence of an input cost channel
through which service regulations influence the volume of exports of SMEs. Table 5 reveals
the relevance of size and, especially, TFP for the export performance of SMEs, with point
elasticities of 0.9 and 2.4 per cent, respectively. Likewise, the results show that the SMEs
reporting a recessionary main market witnessed a significant rise of their sales abroad
compared to those that did not report it. In addition, the estimates suggest that the age
of the firm and the number of industrial establishments are negatively associated to the
volume of exports. The latter result might capture, among other factors, the presence of
an expansion strategy that favours reaching the domestic market over gaining scale or
location for the foreign market. On the other hand, capital intensity, the level of long-term
leverage with financial institutions and being owned by a foreign multinational corpora-
tion are not significantly associated to the export volume of SMEs.26
5. The estimated impact of service sector deregulation on firms’ exports
This section presents a number of simulations that intend to illustrate the impact on firm-
level manufacturing exports of adopting a more efficient regulatory framework in up-
stream services. Given the evidence gathered so far, the simulations are confined to the
case of large firms. Using the estimated coefficients reported in column 3 of Table 2, the
first exercise compares the rate of variation in the price of intermediate consumption from
1991 to 2007 fitted by the model with the corresponding counterpart once we assume
that all components of REGjt stayed constant over the sample period at their respective
1989 value. We then apply the long-run elasticity of exports (1.25 per cent) to the dif-
ference of the above inflation rates in order to gauge an orientative magnitude of the
difference in export performance between the scenario in which Spain did not improve
its regulatory framework at all and the scenario of observed service sector deregulation.
26 The specifications in Table 5 do not include the market share in the main market, as an overwhelming major-
ity of SMEs declare it to be atomistic.
Figure 3 presents the results of the first simulation.27 The figure shows that the effects of
lower service regulation on downstream manufacturing exports can be sizeable: from the
smallest gains recorded in electrical and optical equipment (8.9 per cent) and transport
equipment (14.3 per cent) to the largest gains recorded in chemicals (27 per cent), food
products (27.7 per cent) and other non-metallic mineral products (36.6 per cent). From
1991 to 2007, the effect of services reforms channelled through the price of intermediate
consumption increased exports by 22 per cent, on average. Consistent with Figure 2, the
firms that benefited the most belonged to industries typically more dependent on service
inputs.
27 In the figure, the numbering of manufacturing industries follows the order displayed in Table A.1.
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Figure 3: Difference in total exports of large firms by sector of activity:
Deregulation vs. no deregulation, 1991-2007 (%).
Figure 4: Potential increase in total exports of large firms by sector of activity from
convergence to the best-practice regulatory scenario, 1991-2007 (%).
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The second exercise calculates the potential firm-level export gains from Spain’s
adoption of the ‘best practice’ regulatory framework. Our counterfactual exercise assumes
that REGjt managed to converge to the ‘best practice’ value in 2007, the latter defined as
the average regulation achieved in that year by the three countries with the best regulatory
environment over the whole sample period. This ‘best practice’ regulation value is used to
extract the simulated rate of variation in the price of intermediate consumption from 1991
to 2007, which is then compared with the fitted rate of variation of observed deregulation.
Once again, we apply the long-run elasticity of exports to the difference in inflation rates.
Figure 4 depicts the results of the exercise. Convergence to the ‘best practice’ regulatory
framework would have increased exports by a further 9.8 per cent, with a range of vari-
ation that spans from 5 per cent (electrical and optical equipment) to 14.5 per cent (food
products).
6. Robustness
Once our main findings are established, we carry out a number of robustness checks
on the identification of the input cost channel. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 present the
results of the full empirical model in Eq. (4) when the direct weights of Spain’s input-
output matrix for the year 2000 are used to compute the extent of service dependence
in the measure of REGjt. Once again, the evidence suggests that there is an input cost
channel through which services reforms affect large firms’ exports, while the evidence for
SMEs is lacking.28 Albeit the coefficient estimate on the price of intermediate consumption
28 This conclusion is robust to the use of the direct and indirect weights of the US input-output table for the
year 2000 in the construction of REG. In an attempt to solve the measurement problem associated to service
dependence, Barone and Cingano (2011) adopt the approach of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006). The objective is
to recover a measure of industry-level service dependence that is not specific to a benchmark country or to a level
of regulation. Under this approach, a two-step estimation procedure produces an instrument for average service-
dependence. Once the instrument is incorporated in the REG measure, Barone and Cingano (2011) confirm the
robustness of their estimated baseline model.
increases somewhat if compared to the baseline SMEs’ specification, the exogeneity tests
cast some doubt on instrument validity. Notice that the coefficient estimates of the other
explanatory variables remain robust to the change of benchmark input-output matrix.
The results that figure in columns 2 and 5 of Table 6 account for the potential role of
financial confounders identified in the literature. In particular, financial depth addresses
the impact on firm exports of the scope and quality of Spain’s financial system, while
allowing for different levels of financial dependence by industry. Financial depth is thus
defined as the product of financial development and external financial dependence, where
the former is proxied by the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP and the latter is
measured by an industry-level index of short-term liquidity needs (Raddatz, 2006, and
Kroszner et al. 2007). Since Spain’s private credit over GDP expanded substantially from
the late 1990s till the eruption of the 2008 financial crisis, we try with alternative definitions
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Table 6. Service regulation and firms’ foreign sales: Spain 2000 weights, financial depth and alternative TFP measure, 1992-2007
Dep. variable: Log exports
(1) Spain I/O (2) Financial depth (3) TFP based (4) Spain I/O (5) Financial depth (6) TFP based
Regressors
Log exports (t-1) 0.340*** 0.353*** 0.318*** 0.360*** 0.364*** 0.397***
[0.085] [0.082] [0.077] [0.065] [0.064] [0.061]
Input price (in logs) -0.813*** -0.793*** -0.799*** -0.898* -0.798* -0.591
[0.263] [0.257] [0.277] [0.474] [0.457] [0.375]
External IV: YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional regressors: YES YES YES YES YES YES
TFP (in logs) 1.221*** 1.204*** 1.293*** 2.477*** 2.310*** 1.992***
[0.396] [0.381] [0.346] [0.739] [0.698] [0.536]
Size (in logs) 0.695** 0.679* 0.813** 0.914*** 0.944*** 0.934***
[0.348] [0.355] [0.351] [0.212] [0.211] [0.193]
Capital intenstiy (in logs) 0.248 0.225 0.256 0.307 0.274 0.192
[0.190] [0.182] [0.185] [0.206] [0.195] [0.198]
Market share 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Leverage -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.008
[0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.015]
Age (in logs) -0.080** -0.075* -0.089** -0.118** -0.122** -0.105*
[0.038] [0.039] [0.037] [0.055] [0.055] [0.054]
MNC 0.052 0.054 0.033 -0.220 -0.207 -0.080
[0.061] [0.060] [0.058] [0.167] [0.165] [0.160]
Recession 1.034** 1.093** 0.929*
[0.475] [0.466] [0.528]
Number of establishments -0.365*** -0.359*** -0.319***
[0.108] [0.103] [0.096]
FINDEV x LiqNeeds -0.010 0.043
[0.037] [0.037]
Number of:
Observations 3943 3697 3943 3629 3629 3629
Groups 573 562 573 643 643 643
Instruments 46 46 47 53 54 52
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test 0.03 (0.975) 0.50 (0.614) -0.07 (0.947) 1.24 (0.214) 1.19 (0.234) 1.53 (0.125)
Hansen test of overid. 2.56 (0.995) 2.78 (0.947) 3.28 (0.987) 15.1 (0.445) 14.4 (0.498) 15.1 (0.371)
Difference-in-Hansen tests:
GMM instruments for levels 1.78 (0.987) 1.72 (0.988) 2.09 (0.978) 7.11 (0.626) 6.46 (0.693) 8.98 (0.439)
Lagged exports 0.59 (0.744) 0.83 (0.660) 0.21 (0.902) 2.88 (0.237) 2.69 (0.261) 2.61 (0.271)
Input price 0.00 (0.998) 0.15 (0.926) 0.11 (0.947) 2.32 (0.314) 1.46 (0.481) 1.20 (0.548)
REG (level equation) 0.06 (0.813) 0.01 (0.920) 0.28 (0.597) 0.20 (0.657) 0.05 (0.831) 1.55 (0.213)
REG (difference equation) 0.54 (0.462) 0.26 (0.608) 0.07 (0.788) 1.13 (0.288) 0.50 (0.479) 0.74 (0.388)
TFP 0.08 (0.959) 0.14 (0.933) 1.12 (0.572) 3.22 (0.522) 2.41 (0.660) 1.87 (0.393)
Size 0.35 (0.840) 0.29 (0.866) 0.61 (0.737) 5.47 (0.485) 5.85 (0.441) 7.08 (0.313)
Capital intensity 0.48 (0.787) 0.47 (0.791) 0.12 (0.944) 3.60 (0.462) 3.06 (0.547) 2.62 (0.623)
Market share 0.22 (0.897) 0.10 (0.949) 0.32 (0.852)
Leverage 1.57 (0.814) 1.54 (0.820) 1.74 (0.784) 1.56 (0.817) 2.40 (0.663) 2.78 (0.595)
Notes: See the text and the notes to Tables 3 and 5. Financial depth is defined as the product of FINDEV (domestic credit to the private sector, excluding
construction and real estate activities, over GDP) and LiqNeeds (an industry-level index of short-term liquidity needs). System GMM estimation method.
Source: Authors ’ calculations based on ESEE, Fundación SEPI.
Large firms
2000 direct 2000 directOlley-Pakes Olley-Pakes
SMEs
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of private credit that may or may not include credit to the construction and real estate
sectors.29 We use Raddatz (2006) and Kroszner et al. (2007) measure of liquidity needs
by industry, which is defined as the ratio of total inventories over annual sales for US
firms over the period 1980-1999.30 Once again, adopting the US economy as a bench-
mark assumes that the financial structure displayed by US firms captures more closely the
firm’s choice of outside funds that only obeys to technological and economic reasons.31
Notice that external dependence is beyond the control of individual firms and inherent to
the nature of the industry, that is, firms operating in certain industries may face higher
short-run working capital needs mostly related to the variable costs of their activity. The
estimations reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 6 do not find a significant relationship
between financial depth and the volume of sales abroad, albeit the coefficient is correctly
signed and the p-value is closer to significance in the SMEs subsample. Without precluding
the possibility that its effect is partly picked up by the dummies, our results indicate that
the economy’s increased ability to support financial relationships did not necessarily raise
the intensive margin of exports. In practice, the evidence may suggest that manufacturing
firms rely on retained earnings, internal cash flows or some other form of trade credit to
fund the variable costs of exporting. Finally, notice that, after controlling for financial
depth, our main conclusions regarding the evidence of an input cost channel through
which service regulation influences firms’ exports still hold. The rest of the coefficient
estimates are generally stable.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 6 show that the results are robust to the use of an alterna-
tive estimate for firm-level TFP based on Olley and Pakes (1996). In the case of large firms,
29 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggest that private credit over GDP may bias the financial depth proxy
upwards during periods of rapid credit growth, which was the case of Spain in the 2000s.
30 As noted in Manova et al. (2013), the ratio serves as a proxy for the duration of the production cycle and the
liquidity needs to keep inventories stable and face demand.
31 For example, US data is less likely to be distorted by factors such as industry subsidies. Kroszner et al.
(2007) report the median level of various measures of external financing across US ISIC industries for the period
1980-1999. To match our industry classification, we compute the median of the relevant indicators of the ISIC
classification.
32 Estimates are available from the authors upon request.
the coefficient of interest increases and the exogeneity tests tend to improve, while results
again do not support an input cost channel of services reforms in the case of SMEs. The rest
of the point estimates are stable. In two final robustness exercises, we first added the real
volume of world exports by manufacturing industry to the baseline specifications in order
to account for the upward world trade trend of the period. The world exports variable
appears correctly signed but insignificant while the estimate on the price of intermediate
consumption was robust to this change. And second, we included the regulatory impact
indicator directly in the full empirical model of Eq. (4) to confirm that the results were not
driven by the omission of the institutional variable in levels.32
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7. Conclusions
Growing evidence suggests that regulatory barriers to competition in the markets for
inputs matter for the performance of downstream industries. To date, the literature has
shown that anti-competitive service sector regulation curbs productivity growth and de-
termines the pattern of comparative advantage and trade. However, empirical evidence
regarding the firm level mechanisms that drive these results was still lacking. In a panel
study of firm-level data from Spanish manufacturers, we present evidence suggesting
that service sector deregulation reduces the price of intermediate inputs paid by firms.
Furthermore, the pro-competitive cost effect of better service regulation is bigger when
downstream firms are large. Unlike SMEs, large firms may be able to negotiate better input
prices in the face of a more competitive input market environment, raising their ability to
compete internationally. Indeed, our estimates indicate that a better regulation is very
beneficial for the export performance of large corporations, while the evidence for SMEs
is weaker. Hence, firm characteristics matter for the impact of regulation on input prices
and export volumes. Simulation exercises of our baseline specification suggest that large
firms increased substantially their volume of exports as a result of services reforms, such
that the firms that benefited the most belonged to industries typically more dependent on
service inputs.
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Appendix
A.1. Sample distribution by sector of activity.
A.2. Firm-level TFP estimation using Levisohn and Petrin’s (2003) control function approach.
The point of departure to obtain firm-level TFP estimates is the log-linearized rep-
resentation of a standard Hicks-neutral Cobb-Douglas production function where firm’s
gross output depends upon a number of observed determinants (namely capital stock,
labor and intermediate inputs) and of unobserved determinants that are gathered in the
productivity term, commonly referred to as TFP. In this context, we use the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) estimation technique that adopts an explicit structural model of firm
behavior to address the well-known ‘transmission bias’ problem and that accounts for
serial correlation of productivity shocks. In order to derive their production function
estimator, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) rely on the firm’s demand for intermediate inputs
to back out a proxy for unobserved productivity. The identification of production function
elasticities is done in a two-stage estimation procedure that critically hinges on a number
of assumptions, e.g., a monotonically increasing relation between intermediate input use
and productivity, the ‘quasi-fixed’ nature of capital stock whereby the level of capital stock
is determined prior to firm’s experience of the random productivity shock, or that the first
lag of intermediate input use can serve as an instrument to identify the intermediate input
elasticity in the second-stage of the estimation. Albeit the choice of this estimator is not
absent of criticism, from Table A.1 we note that the magnitudes of the estimated input
elasticities are consistent with the ones obtained in the literature using alternative tech-
niques applied to the ESEE database (González and Miles-Touya, 2012).33 The estimator
33 A thorough and critical survey of the estimation techniques available for Cobb-Douglas production function
estimation at the firm level can be found in Eberhardt and Helmers (2010).
was implemented on firm-level data from 10 manufacturing industries using the levpet
command in Stata (Petrin et al., 2004).
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A.3. Time variation of the regulatory indexes in services.
Figure A.3: Spain: Regulatory indexes of four upstream service
activities.
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